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Abstract 
 
  Air Force leadership has ordered the development of an Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) system called the Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS).  Many 
current jobs and positions will be streamlined, restructured or removed, while some will 
certainly be created to handle the new requirements associated with ECSS.  The structure 
of the Air Force is certain to change with the implementation of ECSS.  The Air Force 
has used many maintenance organizational structures since its inception in 1947.  The 
focus of this research is to analyze past organizational structures to define key factors that 
affect organizational change.  A case study style methodology was applied to eight 
periods of maintenance-related organizational change.  Strategic initiatives, information 
and maintenance-related technology advances, change and project management practices 
were evaluated for relational affect.  The researcher found that the strongest relational 
variables leading to organizational structure change were force-size change, budget 
change and major conflict occurrence or cessation. 
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AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE CHANGES:  AN 
ANTECEDENT MODEL 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
The United States Air Force is a large and diverse organization composed of 
many business and non-business related activities.  Since its inception in 1947 and the 
proliferation of information technology, the USAF has developed and implemented 
hundreds of single point, single interface, stand-alone systems.  Each of these systems has 
met a specific purpose, with varying degrees of success.  As the technology has 
developed and the speed of operations has increased, the need for a comprehensive, 
cross-functional, integrated system has emerged.  This system is known as an Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) system.   An ERP is a commercial technology solution that 
integrates financials, manufacturing, distribution, and other business (and non-business) 
functions in a single technology solution.  This system will bring integrated, seamless 
information flow across the USAF by utilizing a comprehensive set of interconnected 
modules.  A key benefit of an ERP system is that it will provide a standardized business 
process model with tools available across the entire organization, regardless of program 
or site. 
Although an ERP system would seem like a panacea for all the information woes 
encountered in any organization.  The conceptualization, development, governance and 
implementation of a single solution for an organization the size of the USAF are a 
tremendous challenge.  The Air Force currently uses over 700 information technology 
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systems, many of which are duplicative and stand-alone.  Some of the problems 
associated with this glut of systems include a multitude of metrics with competing goals, 
non-standard reporting, credibility issues, and time inefficiencies.  In addition, there is 
limited visibility of assets across the supply chain.  It is nearly impossible to track, in a 
timely manner, what parts are in the pipeline or available at any specific location.  This 
lack of visibility makes planning for maintenance or resupply more challenging than it 
could be.   
The effective use of an ERP will bring a multitude of efficiencies to the USAF. 
With the streamlining of so many activities, many manpower positions may no longer be 
required and may be realigned or, in some cases be removed.  This force reduction will 
certainly drive the organizational structure of the Air Force to change.  The Air Force is 
in the development stage of implementing its own ERP solution called the Expeditionary 
Combat Support System (ECSS).    
The Department of Defense has seen its congressionally approved annual budget 
reduced significantly in the last several years.  With increasing budgetary pressure, the 
Air Force leadership has initiated a force wide call to be more efficient in all facets of 
operation called Air Force Smart Operations for the twenty-first century (AFSO21).   The 
logistics leadership has thus implemented a campaign called “eLog21”.  This campaign is 
directed at making Air Force logistics leaner, lighter and more efficient.  Part of the 
eLog21 campaign is the implementation strategy behind ECSS.  The Air Force estimates 
savings of more than $644 Million over the Fiscal Year Defense Plan (FYDP), with an 
additional $320 Million in net savings within the FYDP.  It also estimates more than 
$100 Million annually beyond the current program (ECSS Fact Sheet, 2007). 
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In March 2005, the Air Force issued its request for quotes to the commercial ERP 
development sector.  Oracle Corporation and SAP Public Services, Inc. were the primary 
bidders.  Oracle Corp won the contract because it was able to propose full compliance as 
specified in the request for proposal, and was deemed the “best value”.   
 
Problem Statement 
 
 The Air Force is beyond the conceptualization stage of its ECSS solution.  The 
structure of the Air Force is certain to change with the implementation of ECSS.  Many 
current jobs and positions will be streamlined, restructured or removed, while some will 
certainly be created to handle the new requirements associated with ECSS.   
 Organizational change is nothing new to the Air Force.  Since its inception in 
1947, there have been a myriad of organizational structures used by the Air Force.  Many 
lessons have been learned from each transformation to the next.  Properly identifying the 
main recurring factors and antecedents of these changes, and measuring the positive or 
negative effects of these changes is of great value. 
 
Research Question 
  The main focus of this research is to answer the following research 
question; “Which factors lead to large scale organizational changes in the Air Force?”  
By identifying these factors, decision-makers will be better prepared to optimize the 
organizational changes associated with ECSS.     
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Investigative Questions 
 In order to properly direct the research and answer the research questions, the 
following investigative questions and sub-questions were explored. 
1.  What have been the significant organizational changes undertaken by the Air 
Force, since 1947, specifically in the field of maintenance? 
2.  What were the driving factors or antecedents leading to each organizational 
change? 
A. How are the changes similar? 
3.  What was the outcome of each structural change? 
 A.  Why were the changes successful or not?  
4.  Was there a pattern to the series of organizational changes?   
 A. How closely does the pattern follow the “double helix” cycle of 
organizational evolution?  
 
Scope/Limitations 
  The research is conducted by studying the history of organizational 
structure changes in the Air Force.  This study focused on changes related to maintenance 
command and control.  Historical information is used for case-study style analysis.   
Some data pertaining to degree of impact for these factors may not be available for 
evaluation.    
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Methodology 
 A case-study style methodology grounded in business process change theory is 
used to create a matrix of key factors and antecedents of organizational structure change 
events.  The case-study matrix will quantify and stratify the most significant causal 
factors involved in facilitating these organizational changes.  Furthermore, analysis of 
these findings attempts to discover if an identifiable cyclical “double helix” type trend 
exists in the cycle of structural changes. 
The Logistics Transformation Office (LTO) AF/A4I Directorate of 
Transformation is the office of primary responsibility for the blueprinting and 
conceptualization of ECSS.  The findings of this research are provided to the LTO to aid 
in the successful planning and implementation of ECSS related organizational structure 
change decisions.  
 
Summary 
 Faced with reduced budgets and the need to increase efficiencies the Air Force is 
implementing its own ERP system called ECSS, which will provide information support 
to all facets of operations in a single integrated technology solution.  ECSS will take the 
place of over 250 legacy information systems, and provide seamless information interface 
between all segments of the organization.  The full implementation of this system is 
scheduled for the summer of 2013.  ECSS is estimated to save the Air Force over $644 
Million total in the Fiscal Year Defense Plan.   
 Once successfully implemented this ERP system will create the efficiencies 
required to propel the Air Force well into the twenty-first century.  However, 
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implementing an enterprise wide system of this magnitude is fraught with difficulties and 
highly complex coordination requirements which will certainly impact the organizational 
structure of Air Force maintenance.  This research focuses on the key factors that lead to 
organizational structure change, and attempts to identify areas that the Air Force can 
focus on to ensure ECSS’s success. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Chapter Overview 
 In order to set the theoretical lens for this research, this chapter will review the 
following; Business Process Change, Organizational Change and Contingency theories, 
business cyclicality, and enterprise resource planning efforts.  These theories have wide-
spread business applicability; this chapter will attempt to relate these concepts to changes 
in maintenance organizational structure. 
 
BUSINESS PROCESS CHANGE THEORY 
In the recent past, academics and practitioners have challenged the ways in which 
organizations structure themselves.  Traditional models of hierarchy and control are 
described as pathological and appropriate for an era of stability, but inappropriate for 
today’s quickly evolving business world.  Organizational change has been called for 
under banners of downsizing, restructuring, and business process reengineering.  These 
projects often engender themes of empowerment, teamwork, and customer orientation.  
While billions of dollars have been spent to redesign organizational business processes, 
including investment in technology infrastructure, consulting, and personnel, the results 
are uncertain at best.  Some reports indicate that as many as 70 percent of reengineering 
projects fail.  With a large amount of business process change (BPC) research available, 
the time is right to leverage this collective experience and isolate the key factors of 
success or failure (Guha et al., 1997).  
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While many recent studies have attempted to investigate BPC and organizational 
change efforts, they are mostly limited in scope.  Three attributes characterize recent 
work in BPC.  First, they are often not based on theory.  This would suggest that the 
diverse research streams in strategic management, innovation, organizational behavior, 
and implementation provide only limited guidance on change efforts.  Second, these 
studies suffer from an over simplification of variables, often isolating their scope of 
investigation to information technology (IT), strategic orientation, or change 
management.  While limiting the research domain of BPC in this manner is effective in 
focusing the research effort, it prevents investigating phenomenon that may have a wide 
variety of contingency factors.   Third, many recent studies look at single organizations 
and single BPC projects.  The advantages of in-depth case studies notwithstanding, 
without variance or divergence in variables, it is almost impossible to interpret results in 
a manner that instills confidence in terms of external validity (Guha et al., 1997). 
The research challenge, then, is one of leveraging existing theory and examining 
diverse attributes of BPC across multiple contexts.  Such an approach, if accomplished 
through cross-case analysis, can complement theories that assume an invariant 
relationship between independent and dependent variables.  This research attempts to 
examine antecedents to BPC outcomes by applying a theoretical framework that includes 
a wide variety of variables consistently across case studies with diverse outcomes (Guha 
et al., 1997).   
BPC is defined as an organizational initiative to design business processes to 
achieve significant improvement in performance (e.g., quality, responsiveness, cost, 
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flexibility, satisfaction, shareholder value, and other critical process measures) through 
changes in the relationships between management, information, technology, 
organizational structure, and people.  These initiatives may differ in scope from process 
improvements that are contingent upon the degree of change undertaken to radical new 
process designs in each organizational subsystem and their interactions.  Therefore, in 
any examination of BPC outcomes, consideration should be given to the environmental 
conditions for change and the ability of the organization to manage change in those 
conditions.  (Guha et al., 1997). 
 The relationships presented in the BPC framework are based on relevant work in 
organizational change, strategic management, innovation, and information systems.  The 
general thesis of this framework is that any significant business process change requires a 
strategic initiative where top managers act as leaders in defining and communicating a 
vision of change.  The organizational environment, with a ready culture, a willingness to 
share knowledge, balanced network relationships, and a capacity to learn, should 
facilitate the implementation of prescribed process management and change management 
practices.  Process and change management practices along with the change environment, 
contribute to better business processes and help in securing improved quality of work life, 
both of which are requisite for customer success and, ultimately, in achieving measurable 
and sustainable competitive performance gains (Guha et al., 1997).  
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CYCLICALITY  
 By examining the basic operational structure of companies—their capability 
chains—business genetics helps us to understand their mutation, evolution, and eventual 
survival or demise.  Business genetics feature the industrial equivalent of the double helix 
(Figure 1)—a model based on an infinite double loop that cycles between vertically 
integrated industries inhabited by corporate giants and horizontally dis-integrated 
industries populated by many small innovators, each seeking a niche in the wide open 
space left by the earlier demise of the giants (Fine, 1998).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  The Double Helix (Fine, 1998). 
The business double helix illuminates how these vertical and horizontal periods 
determine the fate of companies, industries, and sometimes the economic fortunes of 
nations.  Internal and external forces—niche competitors, the strain of maintaining 
technological parity across many products, and the organizational decay that so often 
afflicts market leaders—drive vertically integrated companies toward dis-integration and 
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a horizontal industry structure.  On the other hand, when an industry has a horizontal 
structure, the forces exerted by powerful component suppliers and by individual firms’ 
incentives to promote their own proprietary technologies create strong pressures toward 
re-integration (Fine, 1998).   
Forces Behind the Double Helix 
 When the industry structure is vertical and the product architecture is integral, the 
forces of dis-integration push toward a horizontal and modular configuration.  The forces 
include: (1) the relentless entry of niche competitors hoping to exploit discrete industry 
segments, (2) The challenge of keeping ahead of the competition across the many 
dimensions of technology and markets required by an integral system, and (3) The 
bureaucratic and organizational rigidities that often settle upon large, established 
companies (Fine, 1998).   
 These forces typically weaken the vertical giant and create pressure toward dis-
integration to a more horizontal, modular structure.  On the other hand, when an industry 
has a horizontal structure, another set of forces push toward more vertical integration and 
integral product architectures.  These forces include: (1) technical advances in one 
subsystem can make that the scarcest commodity in the chain, giving market power to its 
owner; (2) Market power in one subsystem encourages bundling with other subsystems to 
increase control and increase value; and (3) Market power in one subsystem encourages 
engineering integration with other subsystems to develop proprietary integral solutions 
(Fine, 1998). 
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
 Organizational change is occurring at an accelerated rate.  Motivated to improve 
performance, firms are “reengineering,” “restructuring,” “downsizing,” and 
“streamlining” their organizational structures (Keidel, 1995).  In a survey of U.S. 
logistics managers, 77 percent of respondents reported that their logistics organization 
had undergone a major restructuring in the past 5 years.  Others have also found high 
rates of organizational change in logistics (Lalonde and Masters, 1993).  
The ultimate motivation for organizational change is the pursuit of improved 
organizational effectiveness, driven by a shift in the status quo among the contingency 
variables resulting in an adjustment to organizational structure.  An understanding of 
organizational change requires segmentation of the process on the basis of the important 
elements of change, namely the magnitude, modes, motors, and drivers of change 
(Leenders and Johnson, 2000).   
Major organizational change is “frame bending,” in that it involves a complete 
change from the existing orientation (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).  Movements 
between centralized and decentralized structures represent the most dramatic 
organizational adjustments.  They involve movement from one end of the organizational 
continuum to the opposite end (Leenders and Johnson, 2000). 
The mode of change can be either evolutionary or revolutionary (Miller, 1982).  
Evolutionary change occurs slowly, gradually, and continuously through a series of small 
incremental, often piecemeal changes over time.  Revolutionary change occurs swiftly 
and affects several aspects of the organization simultaneously.  Such changes occur in 
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short bursts, which tend to be infrequent but disruptive.  Radical change occurs rapidly, 
followed by a long period of relative stability (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985).   
 
CONTINGENCY THEORY 
 A dominant message in the organizational science, strategy, and logistics 
literatures has been that the organization must adjust its structure to changes in the 
environment (Hall and Saias, 1980).  Contingency theorists assert that proper alignment 
of organizational structure with external variables, such as environmental uncertainty and 
technology, will result in superior performance (Powell, 1992).  For example, much of 
the contingency research examines the relationship between organization size, 
technology, or environmental complexity with organizational variables such as structure 
and formalization (Pitts, 1980).   
 Contingency theory follows Chandlers’ (1962) dictum that structure follows 
strategy.  However, recent research has found a reciprocal relationship between strategy 
and structure, although strategy is a more important determinant of structure than vice 
versa (Hall and Saias, 1980).   
 Structure is also influenced by the need to have a complementary alignment 
among the internal structural elements of the organization (Miller, 1982).  Factors such as 
task specialization, technology, spans of control, size and responsibility of the 
administrative function, levels of hierarchy, and integration must be balanced among 
each other.  The objective is economic efficiency.  Proper alignment among the structural 
elements is necessary for optimum performance (Leenders and Johnson, 2000).   
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 Major structural changes in maintenance organizations are made for a number of 
reasons.  For the sake of clarity the terms driver, major influencer, and moderator are 
used to describe the elements involved in these structural changes. 
 The term driver has been used to describe each of the three pressures that 
culminate in a major structural change in a maintenance organization.  Outside the firm, 
the driver consists of the dominant environmental pressures, which in turn force 
corporate strategic initiatives, which become the driver for a major corporate structural 
change.  This latter change, the overall corporate structural change, is the ultimate driver 
of the maintenance organizational structure change (Leenders and Johnson, 2000).   
 A major influencer is a person or a group of people inside the company who 
caused a driver to change.  An observed major influencer in many cases is a new chief 
executive officer who has a strong preference for a corporate strategic shift and/or a 
particular organizational structure (Leenders and Johnson, 2000).   
 Moderators include other individuals who were present at the time of the driver 
change and influence the option chosen.  Moderators include consultants, business unit 
managers, chief financial officers and chief personnel officers (Leenders and Johnson, 
2000). 
 
ENTERPRISE RESOURCE PLANNING 
The multitude of challenges faced today by global businesses is expected to grow 
in intensity and complexity as we go further into this century.  Expanded global 
competition has become the norm rather than the exception, with an unprecedented 
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number and variety of products available to satisfy consumer needs and desires.  In 
particular, many firms have implemented company-wide Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) systems, which are designed to integrate and optimize various business processes 
across the entire organization.  According to Davenport (1998), the business world’s 
embrace of enterprise systems may in fact be the most important development in the 
corporate use of information technology. 
When properly employed, ERP software integrates information used by the 
financial, manufacturing, logistics, and human resources departments into a seamless 
computing system.  A successful ERP can be the backbone of business information for an 
organization, giving management a unified view of its processes. Unfortunately, ERPs 
have a reputation for being very expensive and providing sub-optimal results, because the 
people who are expected to use the application do not know what it is or how it works.  
When ERP software fails, it is normally because the company did not dedicate enough 
time or money to training and managing culture-change issues.  ‘‘Faulty technology is 
often blamed, but eight out of nine times, ERP problems are performance related,’’ says 
Pat Begley, senior vice president of educational services at SAP, one of the world leaders 
in ERP software (Parr et al., 1999). 
Given the large financial commitment that an ERP project requires and the 
potential benefits it can offer if successfully implemented, it is important to understand 
what is needed to ensure a successful ERP implementation.  There are two major 
objectives of this research.  First, using a methodology grounded in business process 
change theory, this research focuses on a comparative case study of historical 
organizational changes undertaken by the logistics functions of the Air Force.  Based on 
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an extensive review, there have been no significant studies that analyze the main 
recurring factors and antecedents of maintenance organizational change in the Air Force 
Second, based on the lessons learned and case studies, this research then proposes 
recommendations to optimize the organizational changes associated with ECSSs 
implementation.   
The two reasons for selecting the BPC framework for providing a systematic 
comparative analysis are as follows:  First, since ERP implementation has come to 
involve changing the business processes of companies that implement such software 
(Kremers and van Dissel, 2000), it is important to consider that BPC theory may be 
helpful in explaining the outcomes of the case studies.  BPC is defined as an 
organizational initiative to design business processes to achieve significant improvement 
in performance through changes in the relationships between management, information 
technology, organizational structure, and people (Kettinger et al., 1995).  These initiatives 
may differ in scope from process improvement to radical new process designs depending 
on the degree of change undertaken in each organizational subsystem and their 
interactions.   
As increasing numbers of organizations across the globe have chosen to build 
their IT infrastructure around this class of off-the-shelf applications, there has been a 
greater appreciation for the challenges involved in implementing these complex 
technologies.  Although ERP systems can bring competitive advantage to organizations, 
the high failure rate in implementing such systems is a major concern (Davenport, 1998).  
A number of prominently publicized failures have underscored the frustrations and even 
total meltdowns that enterprises go through in implementing ERP systems.  Allied Waste 
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Industries, Inc. decided to pull the plug on a $130 Million system built around SAP 
software, while another trash hauler, Waste Management, Inc., called off an SAP 
installation after spending about $45 Million of an expected $250 Million on the project.  
Hershey Food Corp. has also held SAP accountable for order processing problems that 
hampered its ability to ship candy and other products to retailers around a peak 
Halloween season (Boudette, 1999).  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
 
Chapter Overview 
 The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the tools and techniques used to answer 
the investigative questions central to the research objective of this thesis.  First is a 
summary of the problem.  Second is a description of the methodology used to answer the 
research questions. 
 
Research Objective 
 The purpose of this research is to use historical organizational changes 
specifically related to maintenance as case studies to identify the key factors that lead to 
organizational changes in the Air Force.  The investigative questions and sub-questions 
that will answer the research question. 
1.  What have been the significant organizational changes undertaken by the Air 
Force, since 1947, specifically in the field of maintenance? 
2.  What were the driving factors or antecedents leading to each organizational 
change? 
A. How are the changes similar? 
3.  What was the outcome of each structural change? 
 A.  Why were the changes successful or not?  
4.  Was there a pattern to the series of organizational changes?   
 A. How closely does the pattern follow the “double helix” cycle of 
organizational evolution? 
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 The next step in this research process is to acquire the historical information 
regarding the significant maintenance related organizational changes that the Air Force 
has undertaken since 1947. 
 
Data and Assumptions 
 The data for this research was extracted from historical information and studies 
concerning the significant Air Force organizational structure changes related to 
maintenance since 1947.  The data was acquired from the Air Force Materiel Command’s 
History Office (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio) with additional information coming from 
the Air Force Historical Research Agency (Maxwell AFB, Alabama).  Each instance of 
maintenance organizational structure change is treated as an individual case study.  These 
case studies provide a business process change theory assessment to identify the key 
factors that lead to these maintenance organizational changes.  This research has been 
conducted and the lessons learned and observed patterns of behavior are presented to the 
Logistics Transformation Office to aid in optimizing the future planning and employment 
of the maintenance organizational structure changes resulting from ECSSs 
implementation. 
 Due to the unmatched size of the ECSS system (more than 300,000 users) it is 
assumed that the proposed maintenance organizational structure changes will be 
noticeably similar in scope to many of the historical maintenance structure changes 
previously experienced by the Air Force.    
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Research Design 
 In order to evaluate the historical case studies it is necessary to build certain 
constructs on the available data (Table 1), they include:   
Table 1.  Construct Definitions. 
Construct Definitions 
  Construct Definition 
1 Strategic Initiatives Actions directed by senior leaders in reaction to the 
environment or self-perception of change requirements. 
2 Information Technology 
The type of role of the technology in the reasoning 
behind implementing the maintenance organizational 
structure change. 
3 Maintenance Technology 
The type and role of the technology forcing change in 
structure based on emerging opportunities and 
constraints. 
4 Change Management Practices 
Managements role in the pattern of change, it's readiness 
to change and the level of participation in the change 
process will have positive or negative effects on the 
change process. 
5 Process Management Practices 
The level of management use of process measurement, 
tools and techniques that directly affected the outcome of 
the organizational structure change. 
 
Summary 
 In addition to the knowledge gained through the literature review, the analysis of 
the case studies using the business process change theory will answer the primary 
research problem of identifying the key factors that have led to large scale maintenance 
related organizational changes in the Air Force.  Furthermore, the proposed framework 
will be used to aid the LTOs planning and employment of future maintenance 
organizational structure changes resulting from ECSSs implementation. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
  
Chapter Overview 
The Air Force’s maintenance related organizational changes are dissected into eight 
sections for individual case study evaluation (Figure 2) for the chronological order of 
these cases.  Each case is established based on the predominant maintenance structure of 
the period.  During many of the cases, multiple organizational forms were used; however, 
each era is evaluated based on the characteristics of the most prevalent organizational 
structure of the time.  Furthermore, each case is broken down and analyzed based on the 
five criteria of the business process change model outlined in chapter three. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Organizational Change Timeline. 
 
The first case period is from 1947 until 1955, labeled the “Hobson Plan and the 
Period of Uncertainty” due to the name of the Air Force’s initial maintenance 
organizational plan and the trial and error of structures used during the post World War II 
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era.  The next period (1956-1965) is labeled “Centralized Maintenance” because of the 
publication of mandatory Air Force guidance in Air Force Manual (AFM) 66-1.  The 
third period is named “Vietnam and the Move Toward Decentralization” (1966-1972) 
because the high operational tempo and deployed status of USAF forces led the major 
commands to adapt their organizational models to meet the wartime requirements.   
The period following the Vietnam conflict is titled “Post Vietnam Centralization”.  
From 1972-1976, maintenance organizations shifted their focus back towards centralized 
control and execution.  In 1976, faced with force draw downs and shrinking budgets the 
Air Force shifted towards a new concept of maintenance, the “Production Oriented 
Maintenance Organization” (POMO).  The next case is called the “Combat Oriented 
Maintenance Organization”  (COMO) and covers the “Cold War” build-up period from 
1978 until 1991. 
After the end of the fall of the Soviet Union, the Air Force transitioned to the 
“Objective Wing” concept of maintenance, this period lasted from 1992 until 2002.  The 
final case is titled the “Combat Wing Organization” and covers 2002 through 2007.  
 
HOBSON PLAN AND THE PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY (1947-1955) 
The wartime need for specialization, coupled with the ever-increasing complexity 
of aircraft, made the move to specialization inevitable after World War II.  This move 
meant the end of the old “master mechanic crew chief system.”  There was a need for a 
new set of maintenance procedures and an organization that could better respond to the 
training and wartime needs (Ventresca, 1991). 
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Once the new Air Force was free of army domination, its first job was to discard 
the old and dreadfully inadequate ground army organizational structure.  This was the 
"Base Plan" where the combat group commander reported to the base commander, who 
was often regular army, with no flying experience.  This sometimes resulted in poorly 
managed aircraft maintenance operations.  For example, a brigadier general commanded 
the 311th Reconnaissance Wing and he reported to the MacDill Air Base commander 
who was a cavalry colonel (Boyne, 2007).   
            The first Air Force Chief of Staff, General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz established a new 
policy, "No tactical commander should be subordinate to the station commander."  This 
resulted in a search for a better arrangement.  In October 1947, the Air Force 
implemented the Hobson Plan.  The Air Forces’ basic organizational unit became the 
Base-Wing.  Under this plan, combat squadrons were temporarily assigned to combat 
groups, which were in turn assigned to a wing.  The Wing Commander was an 
experienced air combat leader.  The base support functions - supply, base operations, and 
medical were assigned to groups, assigned to the wing.   The group of this period was an 
administrative unit that consisted of nothing more than a designated commander and one 
assistant.  The administrative unit only survived in non-combat roles.  The base and the 
wing became one and the same unit (Boyne, 2007). 
  Prior to this, combat groups and support groups often carried different numeric 
designations.  Under the new plan all carried the same.  For example, the 2nd Supply 
Group and 2nd Medical Group were components of the 2nd Bombardment Wing.  As a 
result of this new reorganization, all bomb groups were renamed bomb wings.  This is 
reflected in the history and lineage of every unit.  Over the years that followed, the 
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Hobson Plan was modified, but in the fall of 1947, for the first time, the airmen were in 
charge of the aircraft (Boyne, 2007). 
The Hobson Plan called for crew chiefs to manage all work on an aircraft and 
supervise a team of mechanics in a classic, decentralized maintenance posture.  The crew 
chief very rarely had to coordinate assistance from the field maintenance organization 
(George et al., 2004).   
During this period, Strategic Air Command (SAC) was the leader in establishing 
the specialized maintenance concept.  In the past, a group of maintainers skilled in all 
aspects of aircraft maintenance, called aircraft generalists or “crew chiefs”, would repair 
and maintain every inch of the aircraft.  As the technology developed the aircraft became 
increasingly more complex.  New systems were added or upgraded which severely taxed 
the capabilities of these aircraft generalists.  This added complexity coupled with the post 
war force reductions persuaded the Air Force to adopt a system of specialists.  These 
specialists were aircraft mechanics that became experts on maintenance and repair of 
particular systems on the aircraft, such as the propulsion systems or the avionics (Reiter, 
1988). 
This concept enabled maintainers to repair aircraft faster, and allowed them to 
become qualified much faster.  The net result of specialization was increased aircraft 
availability to fly combat missions overseas and training missions at home-station 
(Townsend, 1978).  
Less than a year after the Air Forces’ inception the Berlin Airlift began, it 
provided a valuable test of the existing maintenance structure.  From June 1948 until 
September 1949, American and British airlift aircraft transported more than 2.3 billion 
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tons of supplies into Russian blockaded Berlin, with more than 278,000 sorties (Launius 
and Cross, 1989).  Lieutenant General Curtis E. Lemay, commander of United States Air 
Forces in Europe (USAFE) at the time, determined the crew chief system could not 
support the around-the-clock flying situation because of the limited number of hours a 
person was permitted to work.  He decided that the only system capable of filling the 
requirements was the specialized aircraft maintenance system.  Thus, specialized aircraft 
maintenance was born out of necessity to support the Berlin Airlift (Reiter, 1988). 
In late 1949, Lemay became the Commander of SAC, and he promptly 
established the specialized maintenance system for all SAC units.  This was the first 
formal move towards a centralized maintenance organization in the Air Force (Reiter, 
1988).  SAC Regulation (SACR) 66-12, Maintenance Management, was written to 
establish a functional aircraft maintenance organization with the wing-base organization, 
which would ensure full utilization of personnel and facilities to produce maximum 
availability of aircraft (Townsend, 1978).  This change created four base agencies 
responsible for aircraft maintenance:  wing maintenance control, organizational 
maintenance, field maintenance, and base flight and transient maintenance (George et al., 
2004). 
The centralized efforts of wing maintenance were directed by the wing 
maintenance and control agency.  Organizational maintenance was responsible for flight 
line maintenance, periodic inspections and accomplishment of technical order 
compliance.  Field maintenance was responsible for aero repair, communications and 
electronics, armament, power plant, and for providing specialists whenever needed.  Base 
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flight and transient maintenance was responsible for all base flight and transient aircraft 
(Townsend, 1978). 
Maintenance structures changed during the postwar period from 1947 to 1955, 
with each command instituting its own system, but the concept of crew chief with 
specialized support became prevalent within the organizational maintenance structure of 
the operational squadron (Ventresca, 1991). 
 
Reasons for the Change 
 The inception of the Air Force as a separate force coupled with the massive 
downsizing of the US military following World War II led to the adoption of the Hobson 
Plan.  The traditional aircraft generalist system was no longer able to meet the needs of 
the quickly developing Air Force fleet; therefore the specialized aircraft maintenance 
concept was implemented. 
 
Strategic Initiatives 
 The first Chief of Staff, General Spaatz, provided the initial vector regarding 
tactical command.  This vision led to the development of the Hobson Plan.  General 
Lemay applied lessons learned during the Berlin Airlift to change the maintenance 
organization towards the specialized concept.   
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Information Technology 
 During the earliest years there were no computers or high tech information 
systems.  Pilots kept logs of key aircraft information, but, consolidation of this data was 
localized and of very little value. 
 
Maintenance Technology 
 This time period saw a dramatic increase in aircraft technology.  There was a shift 
from reciprocating engines towards a full implementation of jet powered aircraft.  The 
role of the emerging technology had a definite effect on driving the specialist 
maintenance concept. 
 
Change Management Practice 
 During this period, implementation of prescribed maintenance structure was 
optional and allowed the MAJCOMs and even base-wings to customize their structure 
according to their preference.  Standardization and Air Force-wide consolidation efforts 
were not key considerations. 
 
Process Management Practice 
 There was a distinct lack of standardization during the early efforts of 
maintenance organization.  Reports were very slow and consolidation was bulky and 
cumbersome.  With many wings using conflicting units of measure, effective comparison 
and evaluation of maintenance effectiveness was difficult, if not impossible. 
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CENTRALIZED MAINTENANCE (1956-1966) 
 
 By the end of the Korean conflict, in the mid 1950s, aircraft maintenance was 
evolving along a haphazard and ill-defined course.  Necessity was the mother of this 
progress, because only during periods of national conflict had any serious thought been 
given to improvement of aircraft maintenance.  In peacetime, prior to Korea, military 
aviation was a low national priority.  Whenever budget cuts needed to be made, support 
areas such as maintenance were always among the first affected (Townsend, 1978). 
 In September, 1956, the first Air Force Manual (AFM) 66-1 was published.  
Implementation of this manual was up to the discretion of the major command.  This 
manual established a chief of maintenance responsible for all aircraft maintenance in the 
wing and reported directly to the wing commander.  The Chief of Maintenance was the 
central control point responsible for all maintenance activities.  Three squadrons worked 
directly for and reported to the Chief of Maintenance: Organizational Maintenance 
Squadron, Field Maintenance Squadron, and Electronics Maintenance Squadron (George 
et al., 2004). 
 The organizational structure outlined in AFM 66-1 was not new, but it was a 
formalized version of existing structures.  This manual was patterned after SAC manual 
66-12, and was based on policies, objectives, and responsibilities contained in Air Force 
Regulation 66-1.  It outlined provisions for an automated man-hour accounting and 
maintenance data collection (MDC) system.  It pioneered the concept of aircraft in-
commission rates, component repair standards, and aircraft scheduling objectives 
(Townsend, 1978).   
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 Prior to the introduction of automated maintenance data collection, there was no 
real data flow from base level throughout the Air Force maintenance echelons.  The only 
information that tended to flow between levels was unsatisfactory reports, and other 
bulky, and muddled monthly manual reports.  The new reporting system outlined in AFM 
66-1 provided for daily, weekly, semi-monthly and monthly reports throughout all levels 
of Air Force maintenance.  The data generated by these reports aided planners and 
decision makers in many areas, including:  procurement of spares and equipment, 
reliability and maintainability of equipment, manpower determination, and budgeting 
(Townsend, 1978). 
 The idea of centralized maintenance organization, standardized for the entire Air 
Force, had strong support from the Chief of Staff, General Thomas D. White (Reiter, 
1988).  In 1959, the Air Force published a revised AFM 66-1 and made compliance 
mandatory.  The new AFM 66-1 directed the specialized maintenance concept be adopted 
Air Force-wide.  It also moved the scheduling of all aircraft under the chief of 
maintenance.  The MAJCOMs published supplements, which somewhat altered the 
organizational structure, to better meet their specific needs.  The basic Chief of 
Maintenance organization stayed intact and this organization didn’t invoke drastic 
changes from the previous organizational structures, it had a stabilizing effect on the 
maintenance organization (Harris, 1991). 
 The 1959 version of AFM 66-1 introduced punch cards for data collection and 
formalized the first use of computers for tracking maintenance activities.  The added ease 
and increased speed, of this early information technology, greatly enhanced the 
information flow in the decision making process.  This maintenance organizational 
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structure had been designed for efficiency, and the economies of scale allowed the whole 
to be greater than the sum of the parts (Reiter, 1988).  The first real test of the MDC came 
during the Vietnam conflict.  Initially, there was no computer capability to process the 
MDC, the data was sent to Clark AFB for processing.  Later, data processing equipment 
was made available in Southeast Asia to handle the inputs (Townsend, 1978). 
 The new AFM 66-1 maintenance management concept grew out of the need to 
keep pace with the rapid technological developments in weapon systems.  Specialization 
and centralized control were established along functional lines with a single maintenance 
manager who was responsible for centralized control, and was responsible to the wing 
commander for all aircraft maintenance (Ventresca, 1991). 
 As directed, all commands began to use AFM 66-1 in the early 1960s.  The 
increasing complexity of aircraft and the need for greater maintenance specialization 
persuaded acceptance of the centralized maintenance concept.  Crew chiefs worked the 
aircraft on the flight line, assisted by other organizational maintenance resources, while 
all other specialist personnel were assigned to either field maintenance or electronic 
maintenance squadrons.  These specialist personnel were located off the flight line and 
were dispatched to assist the crew chiefs as required.  Communications between 
squadrons were facilitated through Job Control, which also maintained the paperwork and 
documentation.  This system involved many personnel that were not directly involved in 
sortie generation on the flight line (George et al., 2004).  
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Reasons for the Change 
 The evolution of the now highly technical Air Force fleet demanded a highly 
standardized, centrally controlled maintenance organization.  The rapidly developing 
technologies had surpassed the capabilities of the old aircraft generalist system.  
 
Strategic Initiatives 
 General Curtis Lemay pioneered the vision for this era by formulating the 
concepts specialized maintenance concepts outlined in SACR 66-12.  AFM 66-1 was the 
key guidance for the implementation of the centralized maintenance organization, but it 
was patterned after SACR 66-12.  Chief of Staff, General Thomas White supplied the 
vision to standardize maintenance organization throughout the Air Force.  General 
Thomas’ decision to make compliance with AFM 66-1 mandatory proved to be a key 
step. 
 
Information Technology 
 
 The Air Force, for the first time, had identified a standardized method for 
measuring maintenance effectiveness.  Additionally, they harnessed the emerging power 
of computers by inputting and tracking these measures through the use of punch cards 
and computers.  The system they created was called the maintenance data collection 
system. 
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Maintenance Technology 
 
 Air Force aircraft were being developed and brought into operation at a very fast 
pace.  Likewise maintenance equipment was also coming on-line to keep these newer 
high tech aircraft in serviceable condition.  However, there were no significant 
breakthroughs in this period. 
 
Change Management Practice 
 The formalization of existing practices enabled buy-in from the maintenance 
field.  AFM 66-1 had a stabilizing effect on the maintenance community and helped 
normalize the previously haphazard organizational structure.  In 1959, the edited AFM 
66-1 finally, made compliance with the centralized maintenance organization mandatory. 
 
Process Management Practice 
 For the first time, the Air Force had implemented a standard set of metrics to 
monitor the level of maintenance effectiveness.  AFR 66-1 outlined the provisions for 
measuring aircraft in-commission rates, component repair standards, and aircraft 
scheduling objectives. 
 
VIETNAM AND THE MOVE TOWARD DECENTRALIZATION (1966-1972) 
Between 1960 and 1966 the Air Force saw a drastic increase in personnel, mostly 
to support the expanding conflict in Vietnam.  Initially, many fighter units were deployed 
to Vietnam on a temporary duty (TDY) basis, but soon TDY manning became permanent 
change of station (PCS), and the manpower situation improved, and HQ USAF placed 
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flight line maintenance back into the tactical squadrons under Operations control.  
Vietnam validated AFM 66-1, although organizational flexibility was needed (Townsend, 
1978). 
 Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) exercised the command option authorized in AFM 
66-1 by publishing PACAFR 66-12, Maintenance Management.  Under this supplemental 
guidance, the tactical flying squadron absorbed the organizational maintenance squadron 
and loading crews.  The Tactical Air Command (TAC) also became aware that some 
organizational changes were needed in order to meet its tactical mobility requirements.  
The “TAC enhancement” program was instituted and provided for on-aircraft 
maintenance and for support personnel to augment the flying squadron to create an 
independent operating entity, as outlined in TAC Manual (TACM) 66-31 (Ventresca, 
1991). 
 The goal of the “TAC enhancement” was “to provide the tactical squadron 
commander self-contained maintenance capability during periods of squadron 
deployments” (Townsend, 1978, 31).  Thus, the era of the “squadron maintenance” 
concept was underway.  Prior to the reorganization, the deployed fighter squadrons were 
augmented with support and maintenance personnel.  TAC decentralized maintenance 
into the tactical squadrons.  There was even a supply section and maintenance control 
unit in the tactical squadron.  The Field Maintenance and Avionics Maintenance 
Squadrons still existed, under the control of the Chief of Maintenance, but they now only 
provided in-shop maintenance in support of the tactical squadron (Harris, 1991).    
During the demobilization that followed the Vietnam conflict, both PACAF and 
TAC reverted to an AFM 66-1 compliant structure in order to consolidate resources and 
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to reduce redundancy (Ventresca, 1991).  Even though the decentralized “squadron 
maintenance” concept had enhanced mobility, the TACM 66-31 prescribed system could 
no longer be financially supported (Townsend, 1978).    
 
Reasons for the Change 
 The Vietnam conflict and the high deployment posture of tactical fighter units 
mandated a change from the standard AFM 66-1 prescribed maintenance organization.  
In order for deployed squadrons to effectively meet mission requirements, the 
decentralized structure was the better choice.  
 
Strategic Initiatives 
 During deployments in support of the Vietnam conflict PACAF and TAC saw the 
need to decentralize their maintenance structures.  The deployed state of operations 
dictated that deployed operations squadron commanders needed to have control of the 
maintenance of their aircraft.  The shift to this organization greatly enabled the deployed 
aircraft squadron to meet its mission.  Had there been a more robust deployed footprint 
and indigenous maintenance complex in theater, the move towards decentralization 
wouldn’t have been needed, but, conditions as they were mandated this transition. 
 
Information Technology 
 Although, the Air Force continued to improve its record keeping and data 
collection procedures, there were no significant breakthroughs in information technology 
in this period.  MDC technology became cumbersome in the deployed operational areas 
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and hand kept records became the norm.  In-theater support for information systems 
became a more significant priority, and future development in this area was evident. 
 
Maintenance Technology 
 The Vietnam deployed squadron experience demonstrated the first shift towards 
on- and off-equipment maintenance practices.  Technology continued to shape the way 
maintenance was performed.  A key maintenance technology was the development and 
deployment of maintenance vans.  The lack of established ground facilities led to need 
for a covered maintenance area for troubleshooting and repair.  The covered, power 
generator equipped maintenance van was the answer (Harris, 1991). 
 
Change Management Practice 
 The latitude provided to PACAF and TAC to change their organizational 
maintenance concept provided to be a critical leadership decision in enabling these 
MAJCOMs to meet mission requirements.  It was clear that the normal centralized 
maintenance structure was too inflexible to meet the near constant deployed state of 
operations during this conflict. 
 
Process Management Practice 
 The Air Force continued to measure aircraft maintenance performance and 
effectiveness.  The primary concerns during this period, however, were combat 
effectiveness and ability to meet the wartime mission.  New metrics or visions in this area 
were not published for this period. 
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POST VIETNAM CENTRALIZATION (1972-1976)  
 Based on the dramatic draw downs after Vietnam the Air Force felt it could no 
longer support the decentralized organizational structure.  It directed that all commands 
go back to the functional organization outlined in AFM 66-1.  On 1 August 1972, the Air 
Force published a greatly expanded version of AFM 66-1.  It contained 10 volumes that 
covered every detail of aircraft, missile and communications equipment maintenance.  It 
re-established an Air Force-wide centralized maintenance concept and urged each wing 
commander to make equipment available for maintenance when the resources are 
available (AFM 66-1, 1972).  This presented a very different philosophy because prior 
guidance was predicated on maintenance actions being performed whenever the aircraft 
were not on the flying schedule.  However, the new guidance called for the aircraft to be 
scheduled on an almost perpetual basis, that is, whenever they were not required to be in 
maintenance (Reiter, 1988).  In an unprecedented Foreward written by Air Force Chief of 
Staff General John D. Ryan: 
Economy in the use of resources can only be achieved by balancing 
operational requirements and maintenance capability.  This requires 
planning and comprehensive scheduling of equipment maintenance.  
Management effectiveness can then be measured in terms of maintenance 
accomplishments (AFM 66-1, 1972, Foreward). 
 
 Maintenance and operations were to receive equal priority in planning and 
execution.  This was the first time that any Air Force Chief of Staff had provided 
definitive guidance in regards to maintenance priority in regards to operations.  Daily 
maintenance was removed from the operational flying squadron and centralized back 
under the chief of maintenance, but now with equal footing with operations.  Ensuring 
this balance was the responsibility of the wing commander (Reiter, 1988). 
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 The new AFM 66-1 established MAJCOM evaluation teams to insure compliance 
with standard maintenance practices and technical data.  Strict adherence to reporting and 
documenting maintenance actions was mandated.  Rigorous Inspector General (IG) 
inspections and operational readiness inspections provided clear guidance that the 
MAJCOM option of structural flexibility in maintenance organization was no longer 
allowed (George et al., 2004). 
 The post Vietnam era is marked by maintenance consolidations at every level.  
With reduced budgets and emphasis on economy of effort, the Air Force directed the 
elimination of duplication of manpower, equipment and facilities.  One example of these 
sweeping moves to reduce costs is the Air Forces removal of all reciprocating engine 
aircraft from the active inventory (Townsend, 1978).   
 Chief of Staff, General David C. Jones, created the Maintenance Posture 
Improvement Program (MPIP), to develop new ways to perform required maintenance 
with diminishing numbers of personnel without compromising safety standards (Harris, 
1991).  A separate initiative considered centralizing maintenance to support forward 
operating bases in wartime and to reduce airlift requirements and the logistics footprint 
by creating centralized intermediate repair facilities (CIRFs).  During the Vietnam 
conflict, CIRFs were used extensively to perform heavy maintenance operations on 
aircraft involved in the flying campaigns.  This concept expedited the return to service of 
aircraft by being located near the theater of operations and by utilizing economies of 
scale through efficient equipment and facility utilization, greatly reducing return to 
service times. 
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 In another manpower maximizing effort, USAFE’s Project Streamline evaluated a 
program of cross-utilization training (CUT) of maintenance personnel.  This program was 
a return to the old aircraft generalist ways of maintenance.  The purpose of CUT training 
was to train specialist personnel on the aircraft general activities, normally performed by 
crew chiefs (ground refueling, tire changes, etc.) (George et al., 2004).  CUT Training 
became a staple of the Production Oriented Maintenance Organization (POMO) and later 
the Combat Oriented Maintenance Organization (COMO). 
 
Reasons for the Change 
 The return to normalcy after the Vietnam conflict allowed the MAJCOMs to 
return their maintenance organizations to AFM 66-1 compliance.  The economies of scale 
created under the centralized maintenance concept made better fiscal sense during the 
post-war drawdown period. 
 
Strategic Initiatives 
 Chief of Staff, General Ryan set the tone for the importance of aircraft 
sustainability by publishing his vision for a balance between operations and maintenance.  
General Jones delivered his vision for maintenance to continue to meet mission 
requirements without compromising safety while faced with massive manpower 
cutbacks.  He did this with his challenge of the Maintenance Posture Improvement 
Program. 
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Information Technology 
 Computer technology was becoming much more powerful and affordable.  
Aircraft maintenance data collection systems were still using punch cards, but the data 
was becoming more robust.  For the first time, the Air Force was looking at IT as a key 
area to leverage against manpower and budget declines. 
 
Maintenance Technology 
 The Air Force made great strides in how it maintained aircraft during this period.  
First, it completely phased out all aircraft with reciprocating engines.  The shift to an all 
jet powered fleet meant a streamlining of engine repair technology and facilities.  
Secondly, it implemented the CUT training approach to flight line maintenance.  CUT 
training seemed to be a step back towards the old aircraft generalist model of the early 
Air Force, but, actually enabled aircraft maintenance attain higher efficiencies and sortie 
generation rates. 
 
Change Management Practice 
 The chief of staff made it clear that maintenance priority needed to be balanced 
with operations requirements.  This communicated a significant shift in vision among Air 
Force leadership.   
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Process Management Practice 
 Strict adherence to reporting and documenting actions was made mandatory.  The 
Air Force provided a clear message that compliance with maintenance directives was a 
key measurable and that MAJCOM and unit flexibility was no longer acceptable. 
 
PRODUCTION ORIENTED MAINTENANCE (1976-1978) 
 Several factors led to the development of POMO.  HQ USAF tasked TAC to 
develop and test a program based on concepts used by the Israeli Air Force during the 
Yom Kippur War in 1973 (Harris, 1991).  During TACs evaluation of the Israeli 
maintenance system, a report indicated that the system had great possibilities in the 
fighter environment where rapid aircraft turnaround, sortie generation, and surge 
capability were essential (George et al., 2004).  TAC was faced with steadily increasing 
sortie production requirements but had a static maintenance capability, therefore drastic 
change was needed.  The Israeli Air Force demonstrated remarkably high sortie rates by 
cross utilizing skills of their available personnel.  CUT training became a force multiplier 
that expanded sortie production without increasing personnel (Reiter, 1988). 
 POMO was developed to increase productivity of the maintenance work force.  
Actual direct production varied from about 95% for crew chiefs to about 20% for some 
specialists.  The purpose of CUT training is to balance the workload and to have 
everyone producing at 60% to 70% of their available duty time.  Some specialists were 
trained into other specialties because of workload (auto pilot to inertial navigation for 
example) (TAC Briefing, 1978). 
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Under the POMO concept, the Deputy Commander for Maintenance (DCM) 
retains basically the same mission responsibilities and support requirements which had 
been assigned under the specialized maintenance concept.  POMO however, introduced 
the new consideration of making the distinction between on-equipment and off-
equipment maintenance (Foster and Olson, 1978). 
AFR 66-5 created POMO and divided specialists into two categories:  on-
equipment, and off-equipment.  Those that were dispatched to the flight line to work on 
the aircraft were placed with the aircraft generalist crew chief personnel into the newly 
designated Aircraft Generation Squadron (AGS), instead of the old OMS.  Those that 
stayed in the backshop to perform off-equipment maintenance were now placed in the 
Equipment Maintenance Squadron (EMS) and the Component Repair Squadron (CRS) 
(Harris, 1991). 
 POMO was a structure that increased decentralized execution, but decreased 
centralized control.  It was more of a hybrid than a pure centralized or decentralized 
organization.  However, the DCM was still in charge of all aspects of maintenance, his 
staff retained control of the maintenance effort; therefore POMO should be classified as a 
centralized maintenance concept (Johnson, 2000).  There was a split in authority and 
responsibility between AGS and job control.  The AGS owned the people, but control 
remained with job control.  Job control had the authority to move specialists around the 
flight line.  However, AGS had the responsibility to produce the sorties (Harris, 1991). 
 Within a full wing, consisting of three tactical fighter units, the AGS was divided 
into three separate Aircraft Maintenance Units (AMUs).  Each AMU was equipped with 
all the maintenance skills required for generating a squadron of aircraft.  The key to the 
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POMO concept was the cross utilization of the flight line specialists to perform many 
general type tasks, which, while relatively simple and routine, made up a large portion of 
the day-to-day maintenance activities (Harris, 1991). 
 During this same time frame, the F-111 ushered in a new flight-line concept, 
remove and replace maintenance.  This concept meant fewer specialists were required for 
on-equipment maintenance, and resulted in less detailed technical training for many 
specialists.  Aircraft began to incorporate self-test/built-in-test features that eliminated the 
need for much of the time consuming troubleshooting seen in the past.  With the 
introduction of avionics intermediate repair shops and modular engine components, the 
on-aircraft maintenance became less specialized (George et al., 2004). 
 
Reasons for the Change 
 The POMO concept came into being due to a need to become more efficient.  
Force and budgetary downsizing eroded aircraft maintenance efficiency, and flight line 
supportability.   
 
Strategic Initiatives 
 Headquarters USAF provided a vague vision of what it expected.  It tasked TAC 
to develop a system of maintenance patterned after the Israeli Air Force’s success during 
the Yom Kippur War of 1973.  TAC developed a system that followed the key concepts 
of the Israeli structure, this was called POMO. 
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Information Technology 
 The Air Force continued to find better ways to harness technology.  However, no 
significant advances were made to maintenance IT during this period. 
 
Maintenance Technology 
 This period introduced a new concept of performing on-equipment maintenance; 
removal and replacement of line replaceable units.  This concept meant a smaller need for 
on-equipment specialists and less detailed technical training requirements.  Aircraft also 
began to incorporate self-test capabilities which greatly reduced troubleshooting times. 
 
Change Management Practice 
 POMO received top level support as an organizational change that would provide 
greater maintenance effectiveness in the era of constant downsizing.  The shift toward 
decentralization of maintenance effort was slight and was well supported.  The major 
changes in the distinction between on- and off-equipment support for specialists was not 
as well supported by the maintenance community and may be partially responsible for the 
lack of sustained performance gains. 
 
Process Management Practice 
 The Air Force was measuring utilization rates and maintenance effectiveness as 
before; however, the rapid demobilization of US forces following Vietnam and 
continually declining budget had eroded the technical expertise of the maintenance 
community.  Additionally, POMO encouraged the measurement of unit performance at 
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the composite level.  This meant that if a squadron had three AMUs, strong performance 
by two AMUs would mask the poor performance by the third. 
 
COMBAT ORIENTED MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION (1978-1991) 
 TAC had set an aircraft utilization rate (UTE rate) of 18 sorties and 25 hours per 
aircraft per month.  General Wilbur L. Creech took command of TAC in 1978, and 
ordered an independent study of POMO’s effectiveness.  The study, which covered the 
period of 1969 through the second quarter of 1978, showed TAC’s sortie production was 
in steady decline.  General Creech felt the organization of maintenance was a major 
factor in the decline and commissioned a study to propose an organization that would fix 
TAC’s declining maintenance performance—that concept was the Combat Oriented 
Maintenance Organization (COMO) (Harris, 1991). 
 TAC Regulation 66-5, Combat Oriented Maintenance Organization, formalized 
COMO as the maintenance structure for TAC in late 1978.  Many aspects of the 
maintenance organization changed with COMO.  Control became decentralized for 
maintenance operations.  COMOs features include: 
1. Each squadron or AMU does its own scheduling, and is 
responsible for its own UTE rate. 
2. Each squadron or AMU has its own dedicated analyst 
to provide statistical analysis. 
3. Wing score-keeping functions such as Maintenance 
Supply Liaisons (MSL) were eliminated and supply 
responsibility was decentralized to each squadron or 
AMU. 
4. Under the new Combat Oriented Supply Organization 
(COSO), the squadron or AMU has its own supply 
support section instead of it being centralized. 
5. COSO also provides for the squadron or AMU supply 
computer to interface with the AGS parts store. 
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6. The squadron or AMU does its own maintenance 
debrief instead of having a centralized debrief section. 
7. The squadron or AMU has its own dedicated Aerospace 
Ground Equipment (AGE) sub-pool. 
8. The squadron or AMU has dedicated phase docks for 
aircraft inspection. 
9. Maintenance has gone from three shifts to two, with 
increased supervision on the swing, or “fix” shift. 
10. Dedicated crew chiefs and assistants are assigned to 
each aircraft. 
11. Job control was replaced by the Maintenance 
Operations Coordination Center (MOCC); AMU has 
authority higher than the MOCC. 
12. There is squadron integrity; assigned maintenance 
personnel work on their squadron assigned aircraft, and 
squadron assigned pilots fly their squadron assigned 
aircraft (Harris, 1991). 
 
The central theme of COMO was “unit pride”.  The units had to not only be 
responsible for their actions, but to have the authority to go along with that responsibility.  
The results of the transition to COMO were dramatic.  Sortie production, from the third 
quarter of 1978 to 1983, rose at an annual rate of 11.2 percent.  In the first full year under 
COMO, 1979, TAC flew all of its programmed sorties for the first time in a decade 
(Harris, 1991). 
In 1990, the mission capable rates increased to an all-time high of 88.4%.  When 
considering the increased sortie rates reported by TAC between 1978 and 1990, however, 
consideration must be given to the fact that the period saw a changeover to more modern 
and reliable tactical aircraft, better technical data, and better test equipment.  All could 
have had an impact on the increased mission capable rates (George et al., 2004). 
There was consensus among senior maintenance managers that during COMO, 
there was a highly trained professional maintenance workforce backed up by a strong 
core of senior technicians.  These professional maintainers saw the transition from 
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POMO to COMO as not a major reorganization but, instead, a realignment of 
responsibilities and functions (George et al., 2004) 
 
Reasons for the Change 
 The COMO strategy was implemented to fix the declining key maintenance 
indicators (aircraft availability, mission capable rates, and sorties produced).  POMO had 
moved the Air Force in the right direction fiscally, but, mission performance needed to 
improve, that’s why COMO was implemented. 
 
Strategic Initiatives 
 General Creech provided a clear vision of what COMO needed to be.  It was very 
closely patterned after the POMO system, but, it infused a “unit pride” component.  
COMO’s structure decentralized maintenance operations by providing each AMU with 
the authority to go along with the responsibility to meet its mission.   
 
Information Technology 
 The advent of the personal computer and the proliferation of local computer 
terminals enabled the maintainers to eliminate the need for punch cards and instead 
directly input maintenance data into the computer systems.  This technology 
advancement reduced the number of personnel required to process maintenance data. 
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Maintenance Technology 
 Reliability was being engineered into the newer aircraft, better test equipment and 
more accurate technical data was being introduced to improve the level of maintenance.  
Older aircraft were being phased out.  For the first time, in the Air Force’s history, 
budgets and personnel were rising without a significant battlefield exchange to spark it. 
 
Change Management Practice 
 Buy-in by senior maintenance leadership was a key component of the 
implementation of COMO.  Professional maintainers saw the transition from POMO to 
COMO as a realignment of responsibilities and functions rather than a re-organization. 
 
Process Management Practice 
 A key implementation measurement of COMO was the team empowerment 
aspect.  Under POMO, unit performance was at a macro level, whereas, under COMO 
each AMU was measured individually.  COMO’s unit pride aspect enabled the true 
measurement of strong or weakly performing units at the lowest level. 
 
OBJECTIVE WING ORGANIZATION (1991-2002) 
 The objective wing was an effort to standardize organizations across all 
commands in the Air Force.  The underlying concept was “one base, one wing, one 
commander.”  Chief of Staff, General Merrill McPeak had to find a way to reduce the 
size of the Air Force without losing combat capability.  His approach was based on the 
following themes:  strengthen the chain of command, consolidate where practical, 
47 
decentralize, streamline and flatten, clarify functional responsibilities, and cut overhead 
(Johnson, 2000). 
Two other major changes happened in the 1990s; first, the MAJCOMs were re-
designated and aligned by over-arching function.  SAC and TAC were functionally 
merged along the line of combat projection into the newly designated Air Combat 
Command (ACC).  Meanwhile, the strategic long range air refueling assets, previously 
within SAC, were merged with the Military Airlift Command (MAC) fleet, into the Air 
Mobility Command (AMC).  The second significant change was the formation of the 
Expeditionary Air Force (AEF) concept; this meant a significant fundamental shift in the 
Air Force’s mobility posture.  The AEF system represented a movement away from 
overseas basing of “war-ready” personnel to a rapid global mobility posture of “ready to 
deploy” personnel locations in the United States (George et al., 2004). 
At the end of the Cold War in the late 1980's, the Air Force and other services 
were directed to begin a 25% reduction in force structure (Deptula, 2001).  This caused 
the Air Force to make another fundamental change to its organizational composition 
which resulted in what is known as the "Objective Wing Structure" (Barthol, 2005).  
 Under the Objective Wing the oversight of the DCM was eliminated and AMUs 
were placed under the operations squadron commanders.  The shift was from a 
decentralized hybrid organization back to a pure decentralized organization (Johnson, 
2000).  The new structure created four groups to perform the major functions of the 
operational wing:  Operations, Logistics, Support, and Medical Groups.  Depending on 
MAJCOM, aircraft maintenance organizations were divided and aligned under either the 
Operations Group or the Logistics Group.  Standard fighter wings under ACC sought to 
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align all on-equipment maintenance within the Operations Group.  Maintenance 
resources and those functions directly related to sortie generation were under the control 
of an operational squadron commander.  Major maintenance and off-equipment 
maintenance functions remained under the newly designated Logistics Group.  Strategic 
airlift and refueling units within AMC aligned all on- and off-equipment maintenance 
functions under the Logistics Group in the AGS.  This was done with the intent to match 
functions more closely to mission requirements.  The goals of the objective wing 
structure were to decentralize authority, remove unnecessary layers, and give field 
commanders responsibility for all elements necessary for mission accomplishment (Gray 
and Ranalli, 1993).   
The objective wing was designed to align personnel around a specific 
"manufacturing division", the operational flying squadron, and sorties were the unit of 
production.  The Operations Group was responsible for the entire sortie producing effort.  
The Logistics Group performed all major and off-equipment maintenance and other 
supporting logistical functions.  During the 1990's, the Air Force continued to recognize 
the need to adapt to the changing global environment (Deptula, 2001).  Corrective actions 
were required in response to the difficulties encountered in the first Iraq War propelling 
initiatives that required new operating standards.  The emergence of the AEF concept in 
the mid-1990's intended to further decentralize authority and provide greater combat 
flexibility needed for the uncertain battlefield of the 21st century (Barthol, 2005).    
The objective wing followed a strategy of decentralization in an effort to increase 
efficiency.  When the Objective Wing was implemented, the Air Force had excess 
manpower.  However, during the draw downs of the 1990s the Air Force lost a 
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disproportionate percentage of its most skilled maintenance technicians.  They quickly 
went from excess manpower during the draw down to manpower shortages and a 
dramatic loss of experience.  The poor performance of the Objective Wing indicated that 
a high reliability system was no longer in place (Johnson, 2000). 
The Objective Wing was implemented in 1992, but, by 1995 maintenance 
performance had declined to an alarming rate.   Mission capable rates steadily declined.  
ACC Commander General Joseph Ralston commissioned a study to evaluate what was 
leading to the decreased maintenance performance.  In 1995, General Ralston established 
the Deputy Operations Group Commander for Maintenance (DOGM).  This new job was 
to consolidate maintenance oversight and increase expertise for maintenance discipline, 
integration, and accountability.  The downward trend continued (Johnson, 2000). 
Operation ALLIED FORCE became the first combat test for the objective wing 
concept with the DOGM.  Maintenance performance was found lacking.  Aircraft arrived 
unprepared for combat.  Several maintenance units arrived without critical tools.  Many 
aircraft deployed with overdue grounding maintenance actions.  The long-term plan for 
fleet management was not evident.  Operation squadron commanders demonstrated a 
focus on their wartime function of leading pilots, but demonstrated a lacking focus on 
their role of aircraft maintenance (Johnson, 2000). 
 The Objective Wing demonstrated a very similar pattern of maintenance to the 
problems addressed by General Creech, in the 1970s.  ACC recognized the problems as a 
lack of senior aircraft maintenance leadership.  It created the DOGM concept to try to 
counteract the downward trend in performance, however, the trend continued to decline.   
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Reasons for the Change 
 The end of the Cold War, the downsizing of the Department of Defense, and 
Congress’s quest to reap the “peace dividend” led Air Force decision makers to 
implement the Objective Wing Organization.  General McPeak felt the wing structure, 
under COMO, was too top heavy and unbalanced, therefore; the objective wing structure 
was created to find a better balance. 
 
Strategic Initiatives 
 General McPeak had a clear vision of what needed to be done, to reduce the size 
of the Air Force without losing combat capability.  He provided a strong leadership 
vision of the changes he wanted. 
 
Information Technology 
 The internet age of instant information transfer was coming into its own.  The 
existing information systems were becoming more robust and instant data transfer was 
enabling greater visibility throughout the Air Force’s maintenance complex. 
 
Maintenance Technology 
 With the exceptions of the C-17, B-2 and F-117 no new manned aircraft systems 
were brought online in the 1990s under the objective wing.  Maintenance equipment 
continued to improve and technical data became more robust, however; no significant 
advances occurred during this period.  Access to technical data did however improve 
through electronic files and internet based availability.  The invention of the unmanned 
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aero vehicles (UAV) was developed and fielded for the first time.  UAVs have the 
potential to change both the operations and maintenance concepts into the future. 
 
Change Management Practice 
 The implementation timing for the objective wing was tumultuous.  The 
MAJCOMs had all been re-designated and many of their associated functions were 
realigned.  Most experienced maintenance professionals were resistant to this change.  
Additionally, the force reductions of the early 1990s stripped the Air Force of a large core 
of aircraft maintenance experience. 
 
Process Management Practice 
 Upon implementation of the objective wing concept, the Air Force eliminated the 
use of Air Force Regulations (AFRs).  AFRs had been compliance mandatory for the past 
45 years.  The “semi-mandatory” Air Force Instruction became the new method of 
guidance.  Maintenance Quality Assurance inspections were also stopped.  These 
practices were a detriment to maintenance and safety performance. 
 
COMBAT WING ORGANIZATION (2002-2007) 
 
The Air Force Chief of Staff, General John Jumper commissioned a study to 
evaluate the existing organizational structure and to search for solutions to the declining 
indicators.  This study was called the Chief of Staff Logistics Review (CLR).  The results 
of this study, proposed a new universal format for aircraft wing organization known as 
the “Combat Wing Structure” (Barthol, 2005). 
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 The major changes under the new combat wing structure were intended to focus 
on core competencies within each group (Chapman, 2002).  The previously titled Support 
Group was renamed the Mission Support Group (MSG).  Standard logistics functions of 
supply and transportation were merged forming the new Logistics Readiness Squadron 
and were transferred into the MSG from the old Logistics Group.  With the sole mission 
of providing all aspects of aircraft maintenance, the Logistics Group was renamed the 
Maintenance Group (MXG).  The Operations Group was relieved of all maintenance 
related resources and functions which were returned to the MXG (Barthol, 2005).   
The intent of this structure was to standardize operations across the Air Force and 
enhance its expeditionary capabilities.  General Jumper said the reorganization 
emphasizes “three core competencies.”  They are: “to operate air and space weapons 
systems, to maintain these complex weapons systems, and enhance direct mission support 
of our expeditionary, rapid reaction, contingency-based Air Force” (Chapman, 2002, 11)  
General Jumper emphasized that maintenance of air and space weapons systems is a core 
competency.  He said, “Aging fleets and years of resource shortfalls require increased 
attention to the balance of sortie production and health of our fleets.  This requires career 
maintenance professionals” (Chapman, 2002, 11).    
The vision projected by General Jumper, was to allow each group to focus on the 
essential core competencies and refocus on maintenance policy, procedures, training, 
discipline, and enforcement.  He sought to improve sortie production and fleet health for 
aircraft maintenance organizations as outlined in the CLR (Zettler, 2001).  For the 
personnel of the organizations, members would be able to gain valuable mentorship from 
within the chain of command from the group commander down (Barthol, 2005).   
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Reasons for the Change 
 The combat wing organization was developed in order to improve combat 
readiness, enable the Air Force to focus on its core disciplines, and to better meet the 
needs of the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF).  The objective wing concept had provided a 
long trend of declining maintenance indicators, and a change was necessary. 
 
Strategic Initiatives 
 
 Air Force Chief of Staff, General Jumper provided the clear vision for the change 
to the combat wing organization.  He wanted each group to focus on its core 
competencies to support “the expeditionary, contingency-based Air Force.” 
 
Information Technology 
 Near simultaneous tracking and monitoring of internet based and web-enabled 
information systems have significantly decreased the number of personnel required to 
support and operate maintenance information systems.  However, an enterprise wide 
solution would greatly improve the performance and value of the data currently captured 
by existing maintenance data collection systems. 
 
Maintenance Technology 
 High reliability systems became the norm.  Significant breakthroughs in reliability 
centered maintenance and aircraft reliability engineering have reduced the manpower and 
equipment footprint for aircraft maintenance units.  However, aging fleets and budgetary 
shortfalls balanced out the advantages gained by the technological advances.   
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Change Management Practice 
 The combat wing organization made very small changes to the maintenance 
organization.  Buy-in from senior maintenance leadership was clear and visible 
throughout the implementation.   
 
Process Management Practice 
 Overall balance, fleet health and sorties production metrics were identified as the 
most important to leadership, however; no single metric exists to measure them (Barthol, 
2005).  It is difficult to optimize a system where the key metrics are not standardized or 
easily identifiable.  
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC INITIATIVES 
 When assessing the strategic initiative factors affecting the eight cases of 
maintenance re-organization, it is first important to discuss the left hand column criteria 
of Table 2.  The first category is whether or not the organization, as a whole, provided 
centralized or decentralized maintenance control.  In the early organizations, it was very 
evident which type of control system was in-place, however, from POMO on the 
organizations displayed more complex structures with both centralized and decentralized 
concepts.  For the research, an organization is considered centralized if the wing’s senior 
maintenance authority (chief of maintenance, deputy chief of maintenance, or logistics 
group commander for example) had oversight in the decision making related to 
maintenance activities.  Conversely, an organization is considered decentralized if the 
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senior maintenance authority did not have direct decision making authority over all 
maintenance activities. 
Major conflict is self-explanatory (Korea, Vietnam, the Cold War, DESERT 
STORM, and the Global War on Terrorism were all considered).  Whether or not the Air 
Force faced a trend of personnel increase or decrease during the inception of an 
organizational change are the criteria for the force downsizing column.  Likewise, the 
budget trend category reflects whether the Air Force budget (based on 2008 dollarization 
of spending) was increasing or decreasing at the inception of the change.  The case 
studies revealed that the chief of staff set the tone for most organizational changes with a 
clear vision of what was going to be done.  
Table 2. Strategic Initiatives Matrix. 
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The pre-change and post-change metrics criteria are based on the leading 
maintenance indicators of the era.  The pre-change metrics are the leading metrics 
indicating maintenance performance prior to the change.  A rating of “Up” means that the 
metrics indicate a satisfactory level of performance from the system of maintenance at 
the time, and a rating of “Down” indicates unsatisfactory results.  Conversely, post-
change metrics indicate whether the leading maintenance performance metrics were 
satisfactory (or not) at the end of the organizational structures’ life cycle. 
 In order to answer the force downsizing criteria, with the highest possible degree 
of accuracy, Air Force historical statistics are graphically displayed with an overlay of the 
timeline of organizational change (Figure 3).  An evaluation of slope was applied to each 
of the organizational change cases to determine whether the personnel end strength was 
increasing or decreasing at the start of the organizational change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Historical Air Force Personnel End-Strength with Overlay of Organizational Change 
(OSD, 2007). 
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  Identifying the trend in historical Air Force budget spending was more difficult.  An 
analysis of historical pure dollars spent showed a steady exponential increase over time.  This 
data was of little value when comparing organizational changes over different eras.  Thankfully, 
the Fiscal Year 2008 Greenbook had an attached analysis of historical Air Force spending over 
time with a calculation for inflation and value of the dollar based on a common economic value, 
they called this the 2008 dollarization.  Figure 4, shows the historical Air Force budget spending 
with the overlay of organizational changes, and uses the 2008 dollarization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Historical Air Force budget (2008 dollarization) with Overlay of 
Organizational Change (OSD, 2007). 
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 When analyzing the strategic initiatives of each organizational change case by 
case a few clear observations can be made.  First, the budget and the personnel forces are 
mostly moving in the downward direction.  It appears clear that these trends are unlikely 
to change in the future.  Next, organizational changes happen with great frequency 
following downturns in either budget or force end-strength. 
 Critical examination of the strategic initiatives chronicled in Table 1, indicate a 
strong relationship between force increase, budget increase and major conflict affecting 
an organizational change from centralized to decentralized structure.  Conversely, there is 
an equally strong relationship between force decrease, budget decrease and the cessation 
of major conflict leading to organizational change from decentralized to centralized 
structure.   
 Further comparison of Table 2, indicates no significant relationship between 
positive post-change metrics and type of control (centralized or decentralized).  The end 
goal of any initiated organizational change should be to attain satisfactory, or higher, 
metrics.  Of the eight cases studied, only three demonstrated satisfactory post-change 
metrics.  COMO showed the highest post-change metrics, attaining the highest mission 
capable rates in Air Force history.   
 Analysis of information and maintenance technology, and change and process 
management processes provide support for the findings listed above. 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES 
 The criteria for the information technology initiatives were more than the strategic 
initiatives were.  Two questions were asked, first was there evident advancement in 
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information technology, as related to aircraft maintenance, and was there an advantage 
gained from this technology.  Table 3 evaluates the information technology initiatives. 
Table 3.  Information Technology Matrix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Analysis of the information technology aspect of the organizational change cases 
showed steady development and gains in maintenance data collection and reporting.  No 
strategic advantage was evident during the collection of this data for this study.  The 
aspect of information technology was added to this study due to the impending enterprise 
resource planning effort underway for ECSS.  ECSS will provide efficiencies and 
decrease informational workloads that will revolutionize maintenance reporting.  This 
portion of the research was an attempt to identify if any similar revolutions had occurred 
regarding aircraft maintenance. 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MAINTENANCE TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 Aircraft upgrades and add-on systems made keeping up with aircraft technology a 
very difficult process.  The advent of the Air Force as a separate force followed very 
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closely with the technological advances moving away from reciprocating engines towards 
an all jet force.  The three criteria on the left of Table 4 are “Significant Aircraft 
Upgrade,” this area considers development of more advanced aircraft.  “New 
Maintenance Techniques” considers improvements such as the specialized maintenance 
concept and cross utilization training.  “Other Maintenance Tech Advances” includes 
things such as the mobile maintenance vans employed during Vietnam, and the fielding 
of unmanned aero vehicles.  
Table 4.  Maintenance Technology Matrix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Analysis of Table 4 indicates a very loose and sporadic relationship between 
maintenance technology and organizational change success.  It’s clear that developing 
maintenance technology has changed aircraft maintenance, but, identifying a trend in this 
data is ambiguous at best. 
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHANGE AND PROCESS MANAGEMENT 
PRACTICES  
The criteria evaluated in regards to change and process management practices was 
a determination of whether top Air Force level managers communicated behaviors that 
were likely to have positive effects on the proposed organizational changes.  These 
behaviors were either evident or not.  This research found evidence of senior leader 
involvement and support in each of the cases, however, behavior that displays a specific, 
attainable, positive future is likely to influence subordinate behavior in ways that help 
foster successful organizational change.  Likewise, process management practices were 
either evident or not.  Specific instances where Air Force leadership set clear, measurable 
attainable guidance for the methodical attainment of desired end-states were classified as 
evident. 
Analysis of Table 1 indicated a very strong relationship between successful post-
change metrics and leader provided a clear vision.  Further analysis of Table 5 indicates 
that the finding of this strong relationship is strengthened when the clear vision was 
supported by evident change and process management processes.  Additionally, there was 
a clear relational pattern between the evidence of change and management practices and 
the centralized organizational structure.  Conversely, the decentralized structure rarely 
displayed the use of change and process management practices while implementing the 
new organizational structure. 
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Table 5.  Change and Process Management Practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 This chapter discussed the research results within the framework of the 
investigative questions.  The next chapter examines what conclusions can be drawn from 
these findings in order to answer the overarching research question, and discusses 
implications of the conclusions. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter is organized into three sections.  The first section brings together the 
research findings discussed in the previous chapter and examines how they can be used to 
answer the overall research question.  The second section examines the driving forces 
behind the cyclicality found between the organizational changes.  The third section 
contains recommendations for future research on this topic. 
 
Answering the Research Question 
 “Which factors lead to large scale organizational changes in the Air Force?” 
 As discussed in chapter 1, this research sought to identify the key factors that 
affect organizational change in the Air Force in order to help planners maximize the 
probability for success of future changes.  The findings in chapter 4 highlighted the main 
recurring factors that have affected the Air Forces’ organizational changes. 
Strategic Initiatives 
Critical examination of the strategic initiatives, identified a strong relationship 
between force increase, budget increase and major conflict affecting an organizational 
change from centralized to decentralized structure.  Conversely, there is an equally strong 
relationship between force decrease, budget decrease and the cessation of major conflict 
leading to organizational change from decentralized to centralized structure.  
Additionally, this research has identified a strong relationship between leadership 
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providing a clear vision and positive post-change metrics.  This relationship holds in 
every incidence of a clear leadership vision except the post Vietnam period.  Mitigating 
factors for this anomaly could be attributed to the drastic decline in personnel at the end 
of the Vietnam conflict, or the strong decline in budget. 
Information Technology Improvements 
 Analysis of the information technology aspect of the organizational change cases 
showed steady development and gains in maintenance data collection and reporting.  This 
research revealed no relationship between these advances and organizational change 
tendency. 
Maintenance Technology Improvements 
Analysis indicates a very loose and sporadic relationship between maintenance 
technology and organizational change.  It’s clear that developing maintenance technology 
has changed aircraft maintenance, but, identifying a trend in this data is ambiguous at 
best. 
Change and Process Management Practices 
Analysis indicated no relationship between change and process management 
processes and pressure to change organizational structure; however, there was a very 
strong relationship between successful post-change metrics and when the leader provided 
a clear vision.  Further analysis indicates that the finding of this strong relationship is 
strengthened when the clear vision was supported by evident change and process 
management processes. 
Summary 
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 This research has determined that the key factors that have led to organizational 
change in the Air Force are (1) force increase or decrease, (2) budget increase or 
decrease, and (3) the presence or cessation of major conflict.  During every period of 
change, force increase, budget increase and major conflict or force decrease, budget 
decrease and cessation of major conflict have had a strong relational affect leading to 
organizational change.  Additionally, this research has found that when clear leadership 
vision is present, it has a strong relational affect on the post change metrics associated 
with the given organizational change. 
 
Cyclicality 
 The business double helix shows the evolutionary tendencies of corporations 
competing in the open-market; the maintenance double helix (Figure 5) adapts the 
evolutionary model to fit Air Force organizational changes.  There are several differences 
between the business and maintenance models, including the lack of external 
competitors, proprietary standards and market power indicators.  However, several key 
similarities make this evolutionary model useful in explaining the forces motivating the 
Air Force’s maintenance organizational changes.  Industry’s vertical organization is very 
similar to the Air Force’s centralized concept and a horizontal business model is 
controlled in a similar way to the Air Force’s decentralized organization.  Additionally, 
both models have specific, identifiable forces moving each structure towards a cyclical 
change. 
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Figure 5.  The Maintenance Double Helix. 
This research has shown a clear cyclical pattern between centralized and 
decentralized maintenance.  Figure 6 shows the pattern of changes from decentralization 
to centralization and so forth.  The analysis of strategic initiatives, information and 
maintenance technological advances has revealed that several factors drive the transition 
from centralized to decentralized organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Centralized-Decentralized Cyclicality Timeline 
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Centralized to Decentralized Organization 
During times of post-war stability the Air Force has primarily used a centralized 
organization.  Whenever a centralized structure was evident, the forces of major conflict, 
force increase, budget increase, and improved post-change metrics were moving the 
organization towards a shift to decentralization.  Analysis of maintenance and 
information technology advancement has shown no significant pattern moving towards 
decentralization. 
The centralized maintenance organization era of 1956-1966 showed exactly the 
same indicators as the post-Vietnam period (1972-1976) in strategic initiatives and 
information technology, with one exception (post-change metrics).  Both periods showed 
force draw-downs and budget cuts related to post-war stability.  The difference in post-
change metrics is likely due to the severity of cuts following Vietnam, especially to the 
core of maintenances’ experience base. 
The POMO period was a partial move along the centralized maintenance 
organizational spectrum.  This change was the first instance of a change that didn’t swing 
all the way back to decentralized from centralized.  However, POMO was a significant 
shift towards decentralization from the pure-centralized organization used in the post-
Vietnam period.   
Decentralized to Centralized Organization 
Decentralized maintenance seemed to be the Air Force’s preferred war fighting 
organization.  During periods of decentralized maintenance, and after each major conflict, 
the forces of post-war stability, force decrease, budget decrease, and declining post-
change metrics moved the organization back towards centralization.  Analysis of aircraft 
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upgrade and technological advancement has shown that in three of four cases it also leads 
towards centralization.  This factor could be closely correlated between the timing of the 
major aircraft upgrades and the major conflicts. 
The Hobson Plan era of decentralization was marked by early uncertainty and 
later by the Korean War.  As the uncertainty cleared up and the Korean War ended, this 
era showed the same traits as the Vietnam era and COMO.  In each case after the 
conflicts were over (Vietnam, Cold War and DESERT STORM), the force decreased, the 
budget decreased, and shortly thereafter the structure changed back towards 
centralization.   
Similar to POMO, when the Air Force changed from COMO, it didn’t swing 
completely to the centralized concept.  The Objective Wing was a move towards 
centralization, but, it wasn’t a complete reversion. 
Summary 
 The strongest relationship among drivers seemed to be the increase or decrease in 
personnel and budget.  Each case of budget and force reduction moved the organization 
towards centralization.  Conversely, during periods of increased budget and personnel the 
organization moved towards decentralization.  The personnel and budget trends are 
certainly tied closely to the occurrence of major conflict.  In three of four cases, major 
conflict was a key driver in the shift towards the decentralized concept.  
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Implications to Future Organizational Changes  
 All current indicators point toward a smaller Air Force.  History has shown that 
when the force gets smaller, our maintenance organization moves towards centralization.  
It appears certain that the budget trend is likely to continue to decline; this factor has also 
held historical significance towards the centralized concept.  Military operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan have continued over the last several years, however; it seems likely that 
these conflicts are becoming more stable over time.  Increased stability, also suggests 
movement towards a centralized maintenance concept. 
 An assessment of the strategic initiatives affecting the Air Force today makes it 
seem likely that the maintenance organization would remain centralized.  Force down-
sizing, budget reductions and the decrease of military operations, in-support of the Global 
War on Terrorism, are the most evident environmental pressures toward centralization.   
 The advent of the Global Logistics Support Center (GLSC), as the Air Force’s 
office of primary responsibility for supply chain management decision-making, and 
ECSS’s emerging solution, for the Air Force’s logistics information needs, have enabled 
the Air Force to streamline its logistics command and control.  This shift in logistics 
control has allowed the Air Force to select a decentralized structure for its latest 
reorganization.  Air Force Chief of Staff, General T. Michael Moseley has published a 
plan to reorganize wing-level maintenance along a decentralized structure.  In a return to 
the model used under the Objective Wing, the AMU will be aligned under the operations 
commander, imbedded within the tactical flying squadron. 
 According to the findings of this research, all environmental factors indicate 
pressures toward the centralized maintenance organization.  The pressures that have 
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historically led to a decentralized maintenance structure are not present at this time.  
However, the efficiencies provided by the GLSC and ECSS may prove to be the 
antecedents for a successful transition to the decentralized organization. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 A study commissioned by the Air Force Chief of Staff regarding the optimal 
maintenance organizational structure, based on evaluation of the Objective and Combat 
Wing concepts may be of significant value.  General Creech found great success when he 
commissioned a similar study prior to the implementation of COMO. 
This research has found that a clear leadership vision is a key factor in successful 
organizational change; a comprehensive research effort into how leaders provide this 
clear, attainable vision may be very valuable.  Knowledge of which factors positively 
affect change is very important, the next step is to learn how best to influence these 
factors, in order to maximize the benefits of doing the right things. 
Additionally, an in-depth study of Air Force maintenance related information 
technology could be helpful in identifying a more definitive  relational influence on 
organizational change. An in-depth study focused specifically on Air Force change 
management practices could also be helpful in identifying the most influential factors in 
implementing large scale organizational changes or programs. 
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